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2Abstract
In this paper a bioeconomic model is developed for a commercial fishery with multiple gear types in
the case of two independent fish species. Where most bioeconomic fishery models focus on either
multiple gear types or multiple species (mostly predator-prey relationships) this model combines both
aspects for four gear types and two independent fish species. The objective of the paper is to find the
optimal allocation of four gear types per period to obtain the highest net benefits while harvesting at a
sustainable rate. This is done by developing a discrete time LP-model for a sole owner fishery, given a
Total Allowable Catch for the two fish species. The model is applied to the Chippewas of Nawash
First Nation commercial fishery in Lake Huron and Georgian Bay (Ontario, Canada). Sensitivity
analyses are performed on price changes as well as on the average harvest levels per boat.
keywords: efficient renewable resource management, sustainable fishery, multiple species model,
multiple gear types, LP-model
31. Introduction
Fishery management problems often include combinations of economic problems which economic
models have dealt with one at a time. Since Gordon (1954) developed the first bioeconomic fishery
model, bioeconomic models have generally focused on one specific aspect of a fishery. The models
are mostly simplified single-species models applied to one specific fishery. Finding optimal fishery
management strategies, in particular open access versus regulated fisheries, has received ample
attention in fishery models (e.g. Eggert, 1998; Bjørndal, 1988; Clark ,1980). Milliman et al. (1992)
and Cook and McGaw (1996) developed bioeconomic models for fish stocks harvested by two or
more different user groups or fleets. Recent developments in bioeconomic analysis and fisheries
management have shown the need to expand the analysis to multispecies fisheries and management
(Eggert, 1998 and Clark, 1990). In empirical studies, several models are developed for multispecies
fisheries. Most of the multispecies modelling is concerned with interdependent species systems (e.g.
Hannesson, 1983 and Eggert, 1998). Polovina (1989) has developed a model that can be used either
for multispecies or multiarea applications. Only few bioeconomic models combine several aspects in
one model (e.g. Aguero and Gonzalez, 1996). Literature outlining fishery models with multiple
geartypes within one fleet and applications have not been found. Some literature exists on multiple
geartype fishery problems (e.g. Hannesson, 1993; FAO, 1992).
The problem analysed in this paper is an example of a real world fishery problem, namely the
commercial fishery of the Chippewas of Nawash First Nations in the Bruce Peninsula in Ontario,
Canada. This fishery is characterised by catching two fish species given a Total Allowable Catch
(TAC) and limited gear. The problem can be defined as follows: how to allocate the available gear
over the year in a fishery for multiple species to obtain the highest net benefits, while harvesting at a
sustainable rate.
The problem outlined above is of an economic nature. If the problem is not acknowledged (i.e.
the property rights are not defined) and each fisherman catches as much fish as he wants to, an
economic sub-optimal situation exists and there will be a possibility of overharvesting (see Bulte,
1997; Clark, 1990; Conrad and Clark, 1987; Bjørndal and Conrad,1987; Dasgupta, 1982). Overfishing
4can be defined as both biological over fishing, i.e. effort exceeds the so-called Maximum Sustained
Yield Effort, and economic over fishing, which occurs when marginal costs exceed marginal revenue
(Bulte, 1997). Perman et al. (1996) explain that in a bioeconomic open access equilibrium, which
implies perfect competition, the total (and not the marginal) costs equal the total revenues at the same
point where the resource stock is constant through time. Heijman (1991) shows that perfect
competition in the case of a renewable resource, like a fishery, is not an efficient market form. Bulte
(1997) states that the fundamental problem of open access fishery is that fishermen have no incentive
to take into account the shadow price of the resource. To avoid both types of over fishing the property
rights of the fishery have to be not only clearly defined, but also enforceable (Perman et al., 1996).
Perman et al.(1996) and Conrad and Clark (1987) demonstrate that regulation of a fishery might be
economically desirable. In Hartwick and Olewiler (1986) and Conrad (1995) the following regulation
alternatives can be found: (1) closed seasons which limit harvesting during spawning periods, (2) gear
restrictions,  (3) limited entry to the fishing grounds, (4) catch quotas, that might or might not be
transferable, (5) taxes on catch or input that are equal the shadow prices and  (6) establishing
ownership by forming co-operatives. However, discussing the characteristics of the different types of
resource management is beyond the scope of this study. In this study, a given level of the TAC for the
two fish species is used as an exogenous factor to prevent for over fishing. Therefore, the problem
dealt with is not to find a sustainable level for the TAC, but rather to determine how to spread the
TAC over the year, given the available gear and the price variations.
In this study a model is developed to determine which boats should catch how much of each
species, by season, to maximise profits without depleting the fish stocks. The fishery analysed in this
paper is assumed to be managed by a sole owner. Although the fish species regarded in this study are
neither ecologically or technically interrelated, one could speak of a multiple species model in a way
that the fish stocks in this study are managed by the same sole owner, who has to choose how much of
each two species is to be caught. The total net benefits of the fishery as a whole are regarded. In most
fishery models the profits to individual fishermen are maximised. The nature of the fishery regarded
here is such that the benefits are distributed within the group of fishermen.
52. Background of the economic problem
In this section the historical context, the biological characteristics and the production technologies, as
well as the price and cost structure of the Nawash fishery are presented. These factors are all of
importance since they affect the way the bioeconomic model is defined.
Long before the Europeans came to North America, First Nations fished in Lake Huron and
Georgia Bay and traded fish with other First Nations for goods. In economic terms this was clearly a
commercial fishery. The management of native fishery differs from most western fisheries in a way
that the band as a whole is both the manager and the beneficiary of the fishery. Whereas in western
fisheries the government makes the laws and therefore affects the behaviour of the individual
fishermen, but is not the direct beneficiary. In 1836 a treaty was signed between the Queen of England
and the Chippewas of Nawash First Nations, that allowed the latter to retain ownership of a seven mile
zone of water around the Bruce Peninsula (Ontario, Canada) - i.e. they became the owners of the
resource. However, when Canada became one country, constitutional laws were passed that assigned
the management of the resources to the provincial governments. The Ontario Ministry of Natural
Resources (OMNR) considers itself as the owner of all fisheries in Ontario and has set individual
quotas for the main species in Lake Huron and Georgian Bay for both native and non-native
fisherman. In 1993 judge Fairgrieve declared that the Treaty of 1836 must be recognised by the
province of Ontario and that the Chippewas of Nawash have a treaty right to the commercial fishery to
provide for their livelihood. From 1996 the OMNR and the Chippewas of Nawash have a conflict of
interest about the ownership and management of the fishery. Although issues have not yet been solved
between the two parties, in this study the Chippewas of Nawash First Nations will be considered the
sole owner of the commercial fishery in a view that the band as a whole makes decisions for the total
commercial fishery.
In this paper we take into account the two main fish species of the Bruce Peninsula
commercial fishery, namely Whitefish (Coregonus clupeaformis) and Chub, or Bloater, (C. Hoyi).
Some differences exist between the geographic abundance of the fish species. Whitefish can be caught
both near shore and offshore, while chub can only be caught in the deeper rough waters of Lake Huron
6and Georgian Bay. Different boat and net types are used to catch the different species. This will be
discussed later in more detail. No interactions, e.g. a predator-prey relationship, exist between
whitefish and chub and therefore the definition of multiple species we use in this paper is restricted to
the catch of more than one fish species in the same fishery.
Seasonality occurs in the abundance of the fish. There are two peaks for the nearshore catch of
whitefish in June-July and in November-December; offshore these peaks are followed by prolonged
peaks. The peak for chub is in December-January.  The catch rates for chub are not as variable as they
are for whitefish, since there is less seasonal migration. The harvest in pounds of chub is less than the
harvest of whitefish (Crawford, 1996). The data available for this study are harvest data for the years
1995 to 1998.
Two different boat types are used to catch the fish, namely punts and tugs. Chub lives in the
deeper offshore waters and can therefore only be caught by tugs, since these boats are able to navigate
in the rougher offshore waters. However, the tugs can go near shore as well and can therefore catch
both whitefish and chub. The tugs have a mechanical winch, which assists in taking in the nets. The
small punts are lighter and the nets have to be pulled in manually. They can only be used near shore
for the catch of whitefish. The nets that have to be used for the catch of whitefish and chub differ and
are therefore not exchangeable. However, the type is the same for both species, namely gillnets. Both
this and the fact that tugs operate with a four or five men crew, while the punts only need two men,
results in different cost structures for both fisheries, which will be discussed later.
Combining the different boat types and net types results in a number of different gear types.
As explained above, the punt owners are restricted to whitefish harvesting. In this paper, the
combination of whitefish nets and punts will be defined as gear type A. For tug owners, three different
gear types can be distinguished, depending on the nets the boat owner possesses. Gear type B includes
tug owners who only have chub nets. Tug owners who possess both whitefish and chub nets can
choose whether they want to catch whitefish or chub. We define gear type D for tug owners who
choose to catch chub and gear type E for those catching whitefish. Note that gear type B and D are
both tugs catching chub. In Table 2.1 the gear types are clearly represented. Note that gear type C,
which would be punts catching chub, does not exist. The reason for this is that chub is a fish that lives
7offshore, while punts are restricted to near shore waters because of their smaller size and are therefore
not suitable for the catch of chub.
Table 2.1 Characteristics of the gear types used in the Bruce Peninsula Fishery.
Gear type Net type Boat type Choice
A Whitefish Punt No
B Chub Tug No
D Chub Tug Yes
E Whitefish Tug Yes
The difference for the catch of the two species by boat size and net type results in different cost
structures for the fisheries. Punts are operated by a two men crew and they have less operation costs
than the tugs. The purchase costs of punts are also less. However, some restraints exist for the use of
punts within the fishery. The nets have to be pulled in manually and the amount of net is therefore
limited to 100-150 yards1. Although tugs do not have the restrictions that result from their size like
punts do, their bigger size implies substantially higher costs. For example, fuel combustion is much
higher, since tugs weigh a lot more and have to travel a longer distance. The costs of repairs and
maintenance are higher as well. Hence, “the minimum amount of fish required to just cover the
operating costs of the tugs is significantly more than the quantity of fish required to cover the
operating costs of the small boats” (Rollins and Ivy, 1998, p. 9). In this study, only the costs directly
linked to the fishing effort are included. Comprehension of costs like fishery assessment costs and
costs of fish plant operations are beyond the scope of this study.
The prices of fish are an important factor in the decision-making process of the fishery. The prices of
the different fish species may vary over the year “due to supply effects caused by seasonal migrations
of the stock and demand-side market conditions” (Rollins and Ivy, 1998, p 31). Due to the spawning
run in November, the prices of whitefish are low in this period, while in February the prices are
higher. Although the prices do have an influence on the decisions made regarding the fishery, the
8Bruce Peninsula fishery is too small to be able to influence the prices. The Band is considered a price
taker. Because of the fine quality of the whitefish caught on the Georgian Bay side of the Bruce
Peninsula, the prices for whitefish are most of the time higher than the average prices in the same
period (Crawford, 1998).
As mentioned before, the fishery described in this study is assumed to be managed by a sole
owner. This indicates that the Band Council, the management body of the Nawash, represent the
interest of all the fishermen. Assuming this implies that both in the short term and long term no market
inefficiencies occur. This assumption may be somewhat idealised, but any potential deviations from
this ideal are beyond the scope of this study. However, in reality, the conditions exist for self-
management by the group of the fishery as a “common” property resource. As follows from the above,
the net earnings from the fishery do not go the individual fishermen, but to the band as a whole. They
are distributed within the group of fishermen. The distributional aspect is not taken into account in this
study.
The fishing grounds surrounding the Bruce-Peninsula are divided in several management
zones. For each of these zones a TAC is set. In this study however, these management zones are not
taken into account. The analysis is performed for the Bruce Peninsula fishery as a whole.
                                                                                                                                                                                    
1  1 yard = 0.9144 meter
93. The model
In this section a bioeconomic model is developed. Population dynamics are not explicitly included in
the model, but are assumed to be reflected in the harvest levels per boat and given levels of the TAC’s
for the different fish species. The purpose of the fishery is to obtain the highest net benefits without
depleting the fish stock. This is done by allocating both the available vessels and the TAC (Total
Allowable Catch) over the periods. The time horizon in the model is one year that is divided in six
two-month periods. January and February form the first period, March and April the second and so on.
The model is developed for a sole owner fishery, which supplies only a small part of the total market
for the fish species. Therefore, the decision-maker is considered a price taker. The demand-side of the
fishery is therefore not included in this study. As a consequence, the prices of fish and the seasonal
differences in prices are exogenous factors that vary by period.
Most fishery models use logistic growth functions in which harvest levels, as well as natural
growth and mortality rates are included, to derive the optimal (sustainable) stock and harvest levels
(see e.g. Conrad and Clark, 1987; Bjørndal, 1988; Hannesson, 1983 and Wilen, 1985). In the model
developed in this study, the maximum sustainable stock level is reflected in a Total Allowable Catch
(TAC). Rollins and Ivy (1998, p38) say the following about the level of a TAC: ”The purpose of a
TAC is to ensure a constant yield of fishing effort is maintained annually. To this end, if the TAC is
selected correctly, then the stock of fish is such that a steady state level of harvest prevails. This
suggests a constant return to fishing effort employed. However, if a TAC is set too high, then the
growth rate of the stock diminishes over time to the extend that there are less fish available each year.2
Under these circumstances cost of fishing effort would rise. If the TAC were set too low, then the
growth rate of the fish stock is actually increasing to the extend that per unit costs of fishing effort
would be decreasing with the number of fish caught.”
                                                          
2 Obviously, this only holds if the TAC is fully used.
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As mentioned before, the main objective of this sole owner fishery is to maximise the total net benefits
for a year while harvesting at a sustainable level. The purpose is therefore to find the optimal
allocation of the available gear types given a certain TAC. The total net benefits function for the
fishery as a whole for one year is given by
∑
+
=
N
p=
p
p
r)(
NBTNB
1 1
(p = 1, ... , N) (1)
where TNB denotes the total discounted net benefits over the year and NBp are the net benefits
obtained in period p. The time preference  rate r is assumed to be constant over time. The net benefits
per period (NBp) are defined by the gross benefits of catching fish minus the total costs per period
summed over the two fish species. This is expressed in Eq. (2):
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It is shown that the gross benefits are determined by the amount of fish of species s harvested in period
p, Hsp, multiplied by the price of fish species s in period p, Psp. In fact, Hsp reflects the amount of fish
harvested in period p, as a part of the Total Allowable Catch (TAC) for a whole year. The total costs of
the fishery in period p, TCp consist of fixed and variable costs for the fishery. The variable costs
depend on the number of boats per gear type j harvesting fish in period p, Njp , multiplied by the
variable costs per period of putting one boat into service, VCjp. The fixed costs FCjp only depend on
the available number of boats per gear type j ( MAXjpN ) and do not vary between periods. The total costs
of the fishery can be expressed as follows:
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The costs per fish species are depending on the gear type that is used. Recall that a gear type is a
certain combination of boat and nets and that one fish species can be caught by more than one gear
type.
The relationship between the fish stock and harvest is reflected in given levels of harvest per
gear type for the different periods. In reality, given levels of harvest per gear type do not exist. Harvest
is then determined by the changes in fish stock, which can be described in a biological growth
function. The assumption of given harvest levels in this model creates the possibility of obtaining an
optimal solution for the problem.
To achieve the highest net benefits, the number of boats of each gear type to be put into
service (Njp) must be determined. Also, the TAC’s for the two species must be allocated over the
periods.  From the above, two constraints follow. First, certain levels of TAC for the two fish species
are provided. Therefore, the owner of the fishery must decide how much fish of each species can be
caught in each period to not harvest more than the TAC for one year. This constraint can be described
with the function
∑ ≤P
p=
ssp  TACH
1
. (4)
Equation (4) shows that sum of the amount of fish species caught in period p (Hsp) can not be greater
that the TAC for the species in question, TACs. Since there is only a limited number of boats of each
geartype available, additional constraints of the following form have to be added to the model:
MAX
jpjp  NN ≤ (5)
where MAXjpN  denotes the maximum available number of boats of gear type j in period p.
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4. Variants of the model and data
The model developed in the previous section has been applied to the commercial fishery of the
Chippewas of Nawash First Nations in the waters around the Bruce Peninsula in Ontario, Canada. The
data used as input in the model are harvest data from the Nawash Fishery Assessment Program for the
years of 1995 through 1998. The cost and price data we used are derived from the data on the cost
structure of the Nawash fishery and the price lists as described in Rollins and Ivy (1998). Two fish
species are considered in the application, namely whitefish and  chub. The fish are caught with four
different gear types as described in section 2.
First, the basic model is described. After that the results of the basic model are analysed and
sensitivity analyses are performed on the prices and harvest levels of whitefish and chub3. Table 4.1
gives an overview of the different variants of the model.
Table 4.1 Description of the analysed variants.
Variant Description
Variant 1 Basic model
Variant 2 Lower prices
Variant 3 Higher prices
Variant 4 Lower harvest levels
Variant 5 Higher harvest levels
In the basic model, from now on referred to as Variant 1, the time preference rate for one year is set at
6%. This rate approximates the bank rates for the years of 1995 through 1998 as provided by IMF
(1999). The time preference rate of 6% for one year is divided over six two-month periods, which
results in a time preference rate of 1% per period. The prices used in Variant 1 are based on the data
                                                          
3 Sensitivity analysis is not performed on the time preference rate and the TAC. Since the optimization period is
one year (divided into 6 periods) and the time preference rate is 1% per period (corresponding to 6% per year)
discounting has only a minor effect on the net benefits, the timing of the harvest and the allocation of the
geartypes over the periods. Further, the TAC appears not to be a binding constraint in all the variants.
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Rollins and Ivy (1998) provided in their report4. The prices are based on data for the period August 1,
1996 to July 10, 1997. In this study, the monthly prices are averaged to derive prices for each two-
month period. In the basic model average prices are used. The harvest levels per boat for the different
gear types are determined by taking the average per period of the harvest data from the Assessment
Program for the years of 1995 through 1998. Table 4.2 summarises the assumptions on prices and
harvest levels for Variant 1.
Table 4.2 Assumptions on prices and harvest levels in Variant 1.
Period
Price per lb.
whitefish
(CAD $)
Price per lb.
 of chub
 (CAD $)
Harvest
level A
(lbs.)
Harvest
level B
(lbs.)
Harvest
Level D
(lbs.)
Harvest
level E
(lbs.)
1.January-February  1.36 1.50 498 150 150 700
2. March-April    1.20 1.50 511 100 100 1,200
3. May June  1.49 1.50 1,498 900 900 2,400
4. July-August    2.31 1.50 1,929 1,200 1,200 3,000
5. September-October    1.60 1.50 4,328 3,000 3,000 6,000
6. November-December  1.08 1.50 10,504 6,500 6,500 16,000
The Nawash are considered price takers in this study. The prices in  the model are based on price data
for one year. One could expect the model to be sensitive to changes in prices. The Variants 2 and 3
describe two extreme situations with respectively lower and higher prices for both whitefish and chub.
For the lower prices in Variant 2 the lowest price of the two monthly prices per period is taken from
the available data. And analogue to this the high prices in Variant 3 are the highest monthly prices per
period.
                                                          
4 Rollins and Ivy (1998) revised weekly prices for different market class sizes into a list with average prices per
month for whitefish and annual chub prices per pound for 5 size classes. No seasonal variation occurs in the
abundance of chub. As a consequence, prices of chub are stable through the year.
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In all variants the available gear consists of twelve punts and six tugs, of which 4 have both whitefish
and chub nets. The latter implies that the sum of the boats of gear type D and E put into service cannot
be greater than 4.
Variants 4 and 5 analyses situations in which the harvest levels per boat per period are
changed. In Variant 4 the harvest level for the four gear types considered are lowered whereas in
Variant 5 the harvest levels are increased. Both high and low levels are determined by taking
respectively the highest and lowest levels of the harvest profile for four years, as can be derived from
the Assessment data.
The costs of the fishery can be divided in variable and fixed costs for both punts and tugs.
Variable costs only occur when a boat is put into service, while fixed costs also exists when a boat is
not used in a certain period. The variable costs for punts, gear type A, are CAD$ 2277 per period. The
variable costs consist of fuel, grease and oil, detergents, tables, parts and maintenance, repairs, etc.
The fixed costs for one punt are CAD$ 1377, which include costs of the boat, nets, net and fish boxes
and gear. Since tugs are bigger boats and have to navigate in rougher offshore waters, both the fixed
and the variable costs for tugs are substantially higher than for punts. The variable costs are CAD$
3491 and the fixed costs are CAD$ 5352 per tug per period. These costs are based on the data for the
total Bruce Peninsula fishery, as gathered by Rollins and Ivy (1998).
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5. Results
In Table 5.1 the results of Variant l are shown. The variables determined by the model are the number
of boats of the four gear types that are put into service in the various periods and the discounted net
benefits per period. The results for Variant 1 show that gear type A is only used in periods four, five
and six. In these periods the gross benefits are high enough to cover at least  the variable costs. From
the data it can be computed that the gross benefits per vessel of gear type A should be at least CAD$
3,654 to cover the variable costs in one period. For tugs this would be CAD$ 8,843. For period one it
implies that given the prices per pound of whitefish, the harvest per punt per period has to be CAD$
3,654/ CAD$ 1,365 = 2,677 lbs. to break even the variable costs. The actual harvest level per vessel is
only 498 lbs. in this period. This explains why gear type is not used in periods one to three. The
negative shadow price for gear type A in period one supports this.
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Table 5.1  Results of Variant 1 (prices are in CAD$, the harvest levels per vessel are in pounds)
A. Results: number of boats put into service per gear type and their shadow prices.
Period
Number
 of A
Shadow
Price
Number
 of B
Shadow
Price
Number
 of D
Shadow
Price
Number
 of E
Shadow
price
Available boats 12 2 4 4
1.January-February 0 -1598 2 615 0 0 4 2292
2. March-April 0 -1647 0 0 0 0 4 2909
3. May June 0 -36 2 3422 0 0 4 11592
4. July-August 12 2115 2 11517 0 0 4 6733
5. September-October 12 4466 2 4758 0 0 4 32464
6. November-December 12 8677 0 0 0 0 4 25686
Total shadow prices 11977 20312 0 81676
B. Results: total harvest and shadow prices, number of boats used and discounted benefits per period.
Period Harvest of
whitefish
(lbs.)
Shadow
Price
Harvest of
chub (lbs.)
Shadow
Price
Total
tugs
used
Total
punts
used
Discounted
Net benefits
(CAD $)
1.January-February 18,748 0 5,474 0 6 0 -35,780
2. March-April 21,432 0 0 -0.966 4 0 -36,520
3. May June 50,320 0 9,310 0 6 0 19,224
4. July-August 61,752 0 20,476 0 6 12 74,206
5. September-October 157,500 0 11,256 0 6 12 165,260
6. November-December 238,440 0 0 -0.281 4 12 160,600
Totals per year 548,190 46,516 6 12 346,990
TAC per year 1,266,638 1,323,166
Fixed costs exist for all available boats in all gear types. The total fixed costs of the fishery per period
are calculated as 12 * CAD$ 1,377 + 6 * CAD$ 5,352 = CAD$ 48,636. This means that when no boat
is put into service, the negative net benefits for one period are -/- CAD$ 48,636. Putting a boat into
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service results in additional variable costs. The choice whether to use a boat depends on the possibility
to cover at least the variable costs.
The same reasoning for the use of gear type A holds for the periods 2 and 3. In the periods
four, five and six the gross benefits exceed the total costs and all available vessels are put into service.
To obtain positive net benefits for the whole year, the benefits from the last three periods do not only
have to cover (at least a part of) the overall costs made by boats of gear type A for these periods, but
also the fixed costs for the periods one to three.
The gear types B, D and E are all tugs and have the same cost profile, but the fish species
harvested are not the same. The choice of a gear type therefore depends on the prices of the fish
species and harvest per boat. In period one, the two vessels of gear type B are used. Recall that this is
the maximum available number of boats for this gear type. The shadow price indicates that having an
additional tug of gear type B into use (that is not available in the fishery at the moment) would
increase the net benefits with CAD$ 615.5 Since the gear types B and D are both tugs harvesting chub,
one could expect the use of additional boats of gear type D. This is not what happens, though. The
gear types D and E are defined as tugs with both whitefish and chub nets that therefore have a choice
to catch either species. In the results can be seen that in all periods is chosen to put into service all four
boats available for the gear types D and E to harvest whitefish (i.e. gear type E). Although the price
per pound of whitefish in that period is lower than the price of chub, the higher harvest per boat for
whitefish explains the choice for gear type E.  Remarkable is that in the periods two and six, no tugs of
gear type B and D are used. This can be explained with the same reasoning as used before for the
periods one, two and three for gear type A. The negative discounted net benefits in the first two
periods are offset by the profits from the last four periods. The total discounted net benefits for Variant
1 equal CAD $346,992.6
                                                          
5 However, this shadow price overestimates the increase in net benefits since the fixed costs of a extra boat are
not taken into account.
6 The results of all the variants should be compared with average existing net benefits of about CAD $300.000
per year.
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Sensitivity analyses are performed on changes in the prices of the two fish species (Variant 2 and 3)
and the harvest levels per boat (Variant 4 and 5). Table 5.2 and 5.3 respectively show the number of
boats put into service and the net benefits per period of the different variants.7
Table 5.2 Number of boats put into service in the different variants.
Gear
type
Period Variant 1 Variant2 Variant 3 Variant 4 Variant 5
A 1 0 0 0 0 0
2 0 0 0 0 0
3 0 0 0 0 12
4 12 0 12 12 12
5 12 12 12 12 12
6 12 12 12 12 12
B 1 2 0 2 0 2
2 0 0 0 0 2
3 2 2 2 0 2
4 2 2 2 0 2
5 2 2 2 0 2
6 0 0 2 0 2
D 1 0 0 0 0 0
2 0 0 0 0 0
3 0 0 0 0 0
4 0 0 4 0 4
5 0 0 0 0 0
6 0 0 0 0 0
E 1 4 4 4 4 4
2 4 4 4 4 4
3 4 4 4 4 4
4 4 4 0 4 0
5 4 4 4 4 4
6 4 4 4 4 4
The results indicate that price changes do have an influence on the number of boats used. In the case
of a price decrease, in Variant 2, the number of boats of gear type A used in the fourth period falls to
zero as opposed to twelve boats in the basic model. In this period it is not possible for a punt owner to
break even the variable costs. The low prices have a similar effect on the use of gear type B in period
one. Due to the fact that in Variant 2 compared to Variant 1, twelve punts less are used in period four,
the harvest of whitefish in that period decreases. Both this and the fact that the overall prices of fish
are lower, cause a fall in the discounted net benefits per period. As a consequence, the total net
benefits in the case of lower prices fall to CAD$ 206,904. In the case of higher prices in Variant 3 the
only change in the allocation of the gear types is that in period four, the tug owners with both
                                                          
7 Detailed results of  the various models are given in Appendix I.
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whitefish nets and chub nets decide to catch chub (gear type D) rather than whitefish (gear type E).
This can be explained by the significantly higher prices for whitefish as opposed to chub prices. As a
result of the higher prices, the net benefits are CAD$ 400,753 which is remarkably higher than in
Variant 1.
Table 5.3 Discounted Net Benefits per period for the different variants (in CAD$).
Period Variant 1 Variant 2 Variant 3  Variant 4 Variant 5
1 -35,780 -30,350 -10,940 -44,580 -22,910
2 -36,520 -23,150 -17,210 -47,250 -14,420
3 19,224 -11,120 18,991 6,635 96,794
4 74,206 -6,805 64,011 -4,771 181,460
5 165,260 109,800 142,020 58,116 290,420
6 160,600 168,540 203,880 122,150 287,400
Total 346,990 206,915 400,752 90,300 818,744
In the Variants 4 and 5 the harvest levels per boat, which are exogenous variables in the model, have
changed to respectively higher and lower levels of harvest. In Variant 4 the lower harvest levels result
in no chub caught in all periods. The harvest levels of chub (gear type B and D) are so low, that it is
not beneficial for the owners to go out and fish for chub. Putting an additional tug of these gear types
into service would in all periods lower the net benefits. The negative shadow prices for tugs support
this conclusion. As a result, the four tugs with a choice are fully used as gear type E. The benefits of
the fishery in this Variant have to come from whitefish harvest only, while the fixed costs remain for
all gear types. Therefore the total discounted net benefits are lower than in Variant 1  at a level of
CAD$ 90,297.
In Variant 5, where the harvest per vessel is higher than in Variant 1, the total harvest of both
whitefish and chub are considerably higher. As compared to Variant 1 additional boats are only put
into service in periods when at least the variable costs are covered.
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On the basis of the results of the various models it is very well possible to advise the manager of the
fishery described here, what gear type would have to be bought in case one would invest in an
additional boat. The extend to which a gear type is a constraint in the model can be derived from the
level of the shadow prices. From Table 5.1 can be seen that gear type E is used in almost all periods in
all model variations. In Table 4.3 for model 1 and in Appendix 1 for the other models, the number of
gear type E and the accompanying shadow prices are shown. When shadow prices for the different
gear types are summed over the periods, one can conclude that the annual shadow prices of gear type
E are highest in all variants. Based on this it can be concluded that investing in an additional boat of
gear type E, which is a tug harvesting whitefish, would be most profitable.
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5. Conclusions and recommendations
The purpose of this study was to find the optimal allocation of the available gear, differentiated by
gear type and period, to obtain the highest net benefits while harvesting at a sustainable rate. In this
study, a discrete-time linear fishery model was developed. The model was applied to the Bruce
Peninsula fishery. In view of the average net benefits of CAD$ 300.000 per year it can also be
concluded that the fishing behaviour under consideration is fairly efficient.
The model results indicate that the TAC’s for both fish species is not binding. Even though the
TAC’s are not fully used, not all boats are utilised in each period. This points out that in this model
besides the expected ecological reasons also economical grounds exist to not fully use the TAC’s. The
reason for this can be found in the price levels as well as the levels of harvest per boat that are used as
an input in the model. Based on the shadow prices for the gear types, it can be concluded that
investments in a new boat can best be made in gear type E, e.g. tugs with whitefish nets.
The results of the sensitivity analyses indicate the model is sensitive to changes in prices and
harvest levels. The price data used in the application are data for only one year. Since prices do have
an influence of the allocation of the gear types, it is desirable to have more information on the
variability of the price levels throughout the years. The model only provides a good indication for the
use of the different gear types if  the pattern of prices of whitefish and chub throughout the years is
constant. As was to be expected, the analysis performed with lower harvest levels and lower prices
lead to lower discounted net benefits.
In this study a static model is developed for a time horizon of one year. There are several ways
to expand this model. One option is to expand the model to a dynamic version. The waters
surrounding the Bruce Peninsula hold a complex ecosystem. When more information on the biological
aspects of the fishery is available biological growth functions for the different species can be
constructed. As a result of that, the harvest levels that are given in the current model can be
determined by dynamic cost-effort functions and the optimal levels for the TAC per species per year
can be determined. The purpose of the model can then be extended to maximising the total net benefits
of the fishery as well as finding the bioeconomically optimal (steady-state) harvest levels and the
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optimal path to approach the steady–state solution. Bulte et al. (1998) performed both a static and a
dynamic analysis for the Northeast Atlantic mink whales. They conclude that approximating a
dynamic model by annual series of static models would result in a failure of the static model to
account for the impact of current harvesting on future benefits and costs. In a dynamic version of the
model developed in this study, differences in time preference rates can be expected to have greater
impact on the allocation of the gear types.
In reality the fishing grounds surrounding the Bruce-Peninsula are divided in several
management zones. An additional way to expand the model would be to include these management
zones. The model would have to be changed in such a way that TAC’s are set for the different zones,
which in turn would put an additional restriction on the allocation of the available gear.
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